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instant case concluded that it does not violate due process to prohibit property
owners from attacking the judgment by intervention or appeal-an issue not
directly involved in the Eiger case.
The Eiger case recognized that the right to deal in intoxicating liquors is a
privilege and that prohibition, regulation, and restraint of the sale and manufacture of liquor is justified by the police power of the state. That case recognized that it was in the public interest to place liability on landlords for any
harm caused by persons becoming intoxicated in taverns located on the landlord's premises. This insures an injured person that he will be able to recover
from a financially responsible person any damages he may be awarded, and
centralizes the risk in those in the best position to pay the cost. The landlord can
insure himself against any possible liability and pass the cost of the insurance
on to the tavern keeper in the form of rent. The tavern keeper, in turn, can pass
this cost on to the liquor consumers, thereby placing the ultimate burden on the
group primarily responsible for the harm which has been caused to innocent
persons.
The liability which the statute imposes does not require that the property
owners be denied the opportunity to contest the extent of the harm, or to contest whether the tort is one which arose from their premises. Short of actual
fraud or collusion, which the court implicitly recognizes as a defense t6 the
property owners, 31 there are many ways in which the liability of the property
owners may be much greater than if they had been permitted to conduct the
defense. Their liability should not depend on the degree of enthusiasm with
which the tavern keeper defends the original action. Basic notions of justice
require that those who must pay should be given the opportunity to defend.
Bankruptcy-Railroad Reorganizations-Confirmation of Plan under
Section 77 over Vote of Dissenting Class of Creditors-[United States].The debtor railroad filed a petition in a United States district court on Nov. i,
1935, for reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act., Trustees
were appointed and during the ensuing decade four different reorganization
plans were submitted to the district court by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The first three plans were disapproved by that court; the last, which was
under consideration here, was approved in October, 1943.2 This plan reduced
the capitalization of the railroad ifrom about 200 million to about 143 million
dollars and allocated to the old senior secured creditors the entire issue of new
bonds and approximately 88 per cent of the new common stock, which combination at par equalled the face value of their claims plus accrued interest. Junior
,secured creditors were allocated the balance of the new common stock, at par
31Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370, 378 (1946).
149 Stat. 9i1 (1935), ii U.S.C.A. § 205 (x946).
In re Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., C. C. H. Bkcy. L. Serv. 54,562 (D.C.
Colo., 1943). The details of the plan are reported in Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. Reorg.,
254 I.C.C. 349 (1943)-
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equal to io per cent of the face value of their claims plus accrued interest.
Claims of the unsecured creditors and stockholders of the old company were
found to be worthless and therefore were denied participation. The effective
date of the plan was January i, 1943.

Enormous wartime earnings had permitted the trustees to expend fortythree million dollars on capital additions and betterments prior to the date of
the plan, to accumulate eight million dollars cash in excess of working capital
needs as of December, 1943, and to retire in September, 1943, certain senior se-

curities, known as the Junction Bonds, valued at two and three-quarter million dollars. The new securities which under the plan were to be exchanged for
the retired issues were cancelled and eliminated from the arrangement.
Of the thirteen classes of creditors to whom the plan was submitted in April,
1944, all assented to it except the junior secured creditors. Seventy-nine per
cent of those voting in this class rejected the plan. In November, i944, the district court overruled the objections and confirmed the plan.3 The circuit court
of appeals reversed, holding that the junior creditors were reasonably justified in
rejecting the arrangement, on the grounds that they were entitled to share in
the excess cash, and that the new securities freed by the retirement of the
Junction Bonds should have been ratably distributed.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, the junior security holders were not reasonably justified in
rejecting the plan. The ICC properly considered and determined the rights of
all parties as of the effective date of the plan when allocating the new securities.
The benefit of the betterments, the excess cash, and the reduction of the old
senior issues belonged to the new common stockholders since these elements of
value were included in providing full compensation for the senior secured creditors who in part were given the stock in exchange for their old securities. Judgment reversed and order of the district court affirmed. RFC v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R. Co.s
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act as applied to confirmation of railroad Teorganization plans has come before the Supreme Court for interpretation only
twice previously, in the Western Pacific' and Milwaukee7 cases. In this latest op3 In re Denver & Rio

Grande Western R. Co., 62 F. Supp. 384 (Colo., 1944).

4 In re Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., i5o F. 2d 28 (C.C.A. xoth, 1945).
s 66 S. Ct. 1282 (1946). Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that he would file an
opinion later.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, which was published as this issue of the Review was going to press, appears at 66 S. Ct. 1384 (1946). In this opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter upheld the position of the Circuit Court of Appeals with regard to the excess cash and
the retirement of the Junction Bonds, and he went somewhat further in questioning the ICC's
estimate of future earnings and implying that the valuation found by the ICC was too low.
He likewise questioned the majority's interpretation of the "cram down" provision with regard
to the effect of the dissenting vote; further comments on this aspect of his opinion will be found
at the end of this note.
6 Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448 (1943).

Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318
U.S. 523 (1943).
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portunity of the Supreme Court to elucidate the statutory provisions relating to
completed plans, the Court faced one additional problem, declined a chance to
clear up an ambiguity contained in the two previous decisions, and reaffirmed
two interpretations rendered in the prior cases.
This is the first decision in which the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 77 which give the district courts power to bind'a dissenting
class.8 The statute provides that any plan which is not assented to by twothirds of those voting in each participating class may nevertheless be confirmed
if the district court finds that the plan makes adequate provision for fair and
equitable treatment of the dissenters, and that their rejection was not reasonably justified. The use of the provision, popularly known as the "cram down,"
has come before a circuit court of appeals for review only once previously, in the
Chicago & Northwestern case. 9 In that case the plan was confirmed by the district court, although one class of creditors, small in number and amount of
claim, could muster only a 51 per cent vote in favor of the plan; this action was
upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.1o The insignificance of the interest of the objecting class compared with the extent of the claims of the other classes of creditors,
who assented by large majorities, obviously influenced the court's decision, as
did the fact that there was no overwhelming rejection of the plan by the dissenting class. In the present case the voting junior security holders, 79 per cent
of whom rejected the plan, owned almost a fourth of the bonded indebtedness
of the road. In employing the "cram down" provision to bind a substantial
class, which dissented decisively, the court resolved any doubts as to the scope
of the provision which might have been left by the peculiar facts of the Northwestern case.

By finding that the rejection was not reasonably justified, the Supreme Court
in effect indicated that a dissenting class cannot block a reorganization unless it
can show that its rejection is reasonable from the standpoint of all creditors."
Stat. gig (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. § 205(c) (1946).
9In re Chicago &Northwestern R. Co., 126 F. 2d 35i (C.C.A. 7th, 1942). The court took
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the novel position that it represented those security holders who had not exercised their voting
privilege. These "proxies" it cast in favor of the plan. Ibid., at 367.
10Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. Mutual Savings Bank Group Committee, 318 U.S.
793 (1943).
I"The provision of the statute allowing an assenting majority to bind a dissenting minority
in any class of creditors had been sustained against constitutional objections in Continental
Illinois Bank &Trust Company v. Chicago, Rock Island &Pacific R. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (i935).
The junior bondholders contended that that decision was distinguishable by the fact that a
majority of them had objected. Since in the Continental Illinois Bank case the court relied on
an analogy to the statutory composition under Section 12, 30 Stat. 549 (i898), which went
only so far as to bind a dissenting minority, Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhart, 1o9 U.S.
527 (1883), some doubt remained as to the constitutionality of binding a dissenting majority.
Finletter, Corporate Reorganizations 448 (1937); Friendly, The 1935 Amendments of the
Railroad Reorganization Act, 36 Col. L. Rev. 28, 33 (1936); cf. Louisville joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 55 (i935). But if the rights of a secured creditor can be modified
at all, it should be immaterial that the'affected creditor belongs in a class where the majority
of creditors have objected.
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Conceivably any class would, from its own point of view, be reasonably justified
in rejecting a plan which drastically reduced its claims; but it now appears that
if the plan as a whole is fair and equitable the dissenting class can not be reasonably justified in withholding acceptance. The requirement that the dissenting
class be reasonably justified thus becomes mere surplusage, since in any event
no plan can be approved or be submitted to a vote unless it is first found to be
fair and equitable. This result is not surprising in view of the previous cases and
the comparable situation under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,2 but there is
considerable evidence to show that Congress did not expect the Section 77
"cram down" to be used to override a large dissenting class. For instance, the
late Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation and one of the
draftsmen of Section 77, wrote as follows in a letter to Congress: "Arbitrary
compulsion of plans over the dissents of interested creditors is not intended,
nor is it believed that courts will override strong dissents ....by a large single
class . ....X3

A phase of Section 77 which had been left somewhat in doubt by the prior
Supreme Court decisions is the respective function of the district court and the
ICC in the allocation of new securities among the various participating classes
of creditors. The Court recognized in the Western Pacificand Milwaukee cases
that the district court must examine the ICC plan to determine whether the allocation is fair and equitable, but these decisions were vague in indicating the
nature and extent of the findings which the district court would be required to
make in order to have its disapproval of a plan sustained on review. It has been
thought the Western Pacific case held that the district court could not disapprove a plan if there were some evidence supporting the ICC's determination
that the allocation was equitable.'4 On the other hand, the Milwaukee decision
appeared to announce that if the district court had some independent evidence
to support its disapproval, it would be sustained on appeal.' s The opinion of the
Court in the instant case did not consider the degree of finality to be accorded
to the ICC's findings by the district court." This omission may be a corollary
1252
Stat. 895 (i938), ii U.S.C.A. 616 (1946). Although this statute and its predecessors
provided alternative means of treating dissenting classes, such as appraisal and sale subject to
the dissenter's lien, when a fair and equitable plan has been worked out the objections of a
dissenting class have been held not to affect the plan. National City Bank of New York v.
O'Connell, I5S F. 2d32 9 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946); Country Life Apartments Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.
2d 935 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1944).
13 H. Doc. 89, 74 th Cong. ist Sess. (1935). The sense of the comments and debate in Congress on this provision is clearly that it was to be used only when small classes of creditors
obstructed reorganizations in the hope of wringing concessions from other classes. 79 Cong.

Rec.

13,298-301,

13,764-68 (i935).

Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of Federal Bankruptcy
Act, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, 1047 (I943).
35Ibid., at ioso.
,6The junior bondholders had asked the district court to disapprove the plan and order
a reallocation of the new securities freed by the retirement of the Junction Bonds, pointing out
that in a similar situation in the reorganization of the New York, New Haven & Hartford, In
re New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595 (Conn. 1943), the lower court
X4
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of the Court's restatement that the statute was intended to limit appellate review of the findings of "the district court and the ICC' 7 under Section 77. The
Court did, however, reaffirm one clear assignment of exclusive power to the
ICC in the previous cases, namely, to determine the amount and structure of
the new capitalization as long as all relevant valuation factors are considered.
The interpretation of Section 77 in this and previous cases has served to produce a result which appears to be unduly harsh on the junior secured creditors
in the present case, especially in view of the protracted nature of the proceedings. Between 1935, when the Denver & Rio Grande first filed a petition for reorganization, and 1943, the effective date of the plan under consideration, interest accruals increased senior claims by over thirty-seven million dollars. If
the capitalization eventually approved had been adopted and a plan consummated within one year of the road's petition for reorganization, there would
have been new securities available to fully compensate all senior classes of creditors and give the junior secured creditors new paper equal to the full value of
their claims. The increase in senior claims by the running of interest reduced
the participation by junior creditors from ioo per cent of the face value of their
claims to io per cent; if there had been a delay of only one additional year in
the effective date of the present plan, there would have been nothing for the
junior security holders, who were losing ground to the seniors at the rate of over
io per cent of their original claims per year.' 8
Measuring the Denver & Rio Grande plan by the standards of prior railroad
reorganizations under Section 77 also tends to indicate that senior creditors
were unusually favored. In the Western Pacificreorganization, and in many others which were not appealed from the district courts, the ICC allocated to senior
claimants new bonds and stocks of substantially the same type distributed
here, also in the face amount of their claims, but without compensation for their
loss of rights in taking securities with less favorable terms.' 9 In this reorganizahad ordered the reallocation. The Colorado district court refused, stating that it felt itself
without power to issue such an order. Although the point was presented to the Supreme Court,
the Court declined to comment.
X7 Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co.,
318 U.S. 523, 566 (x943).
x8Between Jan. r, I943, and Dec. 31, 1944, accrued interest had increased senior claims
almost nine million dollars. Respondent's brief, chart at p. 44.
19In nearly all reorganizations under Section 77, including that of the Denver & Rio
Grande, fixed interest bonds, contingent interest bonds, and preferred and common stock
have been issued in varying proportions to almost all participating creditors. Those who participate fully get new paper having a face value equal to the face value of their old claims. There
is no consideration given to market values, nor do creditors ever get new securities with a face
value of over ioo per cent of their claim. Full compensation, in the sense of an absolute

quid pro quo, is thus never given, since the new securities almost invariably have less favorable
terms than those surrendered. As one writer has suggested, what is called full compensation is
really a relative priority, because all that senior creditors can demand is complete paper satisfaction before junior claimants can participate. Friendly, Relative Treatment of Securities
in Railroad Reorganizations under Section 77, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 420 (194o). The fol-

lowing reorganizations are typical: Missouri Pacific R. Reorg., 239 I.C.C. 7, 95 (194o); Chi-
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tion, however, the situation was somewhat novel in that the trustees had accumulated eight million dollars in cash in excess of ordinary working capital
needs by November, 1943, much of it earned during a period when the junior
creditors reasonably could have had expectations of participating in the plan
to a much larger extent than that eventually provided. The allocation also gave
the new stockholders the advantage of physical betterments more extensive, in
proportion to the size of the railway system, than those which had been made
by any other major road during reorganization2 ° The value of the new stock was
further enhanced by the retirement, after the effective date but before confirmation of the plan, of the Junction Bonds, since fixed interest charges were reduced
and more income was available for dividends. The result of all these factors
seems to be that the probable market value of the common stock received by
the seniors more nearly approximated its par value than that received by senior
creditors in prior major reorganizations under Section 77.
This relatively strict treatment of the junior secured creditors may be viewed
as being at least in part a consequence of the ICC's treatment of the total valuation of the enterprise. The betterments of the road's physical capital, although
made out of current earnings which would otherwise have been surplus to the
needs of the road and which might have been used to retire part of the senior
debt, were thought by the ICC to add nothing to the road's earning capacity
and therefore could not be used to increase the capitalization. The cash on hand
in excess of working capital needs likewise did not add to the earning capacity
of the road, since the ICC valued the road without reference to the cash. Hence
this cash must have been something in addition to the going concern value of
the road, and the use of the cash to supplement the compensation given the
junior secured creditors would have subtracted nothing from the value of the
road. Likewise if the earnings of the road during reorganization had been used
by the trustee to retire senior securities or to reduce interest claims instead of
to improve the physical plant or to increase the excess cash reserve, the junior
secured creditors would have benefited. On the other hand, the ICC was undoubtedly justified in excluding wartime earnings from consideration in forecasting future revenues as a basis for capitalization, in view of their evanescent
character.
At first impression it might appear that the ICC in declaring the plan effective as of January i, 1943,21 added to the harshness of the treatment of the jun-

iors by depriving them of the benefit resulting from the retirement of the Junction Bonds, since it was admitted by the Court that if the bonds had been recago & Eastern Illinois R. Reorg., 230 I.C.C. i99 (i938); and Chicago Great Western R.
Reorg., 228 I.C.C. 585 (1938).
2*This was determined by comparing the data on expenditures in S. Rep. 1170, 79th
Cong. 2d. Sess., at 41 (1946), with the total investment in road and equipment in the major
roads, as reported in Moody's Railroads (1945).
1
2 That the statute empowers the ICC to select the date on which the reorganization
is to go into effect was decided in Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 38 U.S. 448, 5io (1943).
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tired prior to the effective date the new securities thus freed would go to increase the compensation of the juniors.22 But if the effective date had been revised in the light of subsequent developments so as to come after the retirement, the continued running of interest on the senior securities would have
more than absorbed the amount of new securities freed. The ICC could, however, have taken account of the excess cash in the plan it proposed, and, without modifying the effective date, provided for the use of the cash in discharging
senior obligations. By this meafis the discharge of the Junction Bonds and any
other senior securities might have been used to produce more favorable treatment for the juniors.
The harsh treatment of junior claimants which has resulted from Section 77
reorganization proceedings, 2 3 typified by the treatment received by the junior
bondholders and stockholders of the Denver & Rio Grande, has given rise to
much criticism among railroad men, from the reorganization bar, and in Congress 2 4 This criticism in part has been manifested in a number of proposals for
new legislation, all of which embody so-called "nonforfeiture" principles, designed to retain the existing capitalizations.25 It may be doubted whether attempts to preserve old capital structures are really sound. The railroad debt
6
burden,2
incurred mainly in the first quarter of this century, has proved too
large for many lines to carry,27 especially in view of the industry's changed position in the nation's transportation picture.28 Since most of these roads have not
-RFC v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 66 S.Ct. 1282, 1298 (1946).
23In the eleven years of the statute's operation investments of two and a half billion dollars
have been declared valueless in plans formulated by the ICC. S. Rep. 1170, 79th Cong. 2nd
Sess. (1946). Critics of Section 77 have characterized these losses as "forfeitures," but from a
more realistic viewpoint it may be said that the securities representing these investments
were in fact valueless when the railroad petitioned for reorganization; thus the ICC has merely
faced the facts.
24 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S.1253, Part i,
79th Cong. ist Sess., Part 2, 79 th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1946).
2sTwo proposed railroad relief measures, both of which contemplated retention of the
existing capital structures, were the Wheeler-Reed bill, S.1253, 79 th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1946),
and the Hobbs bill, H.R. 4960, 78th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1944). A third proposal, S. x869, 76th
Cong. ist Sess. (i939), would establish a special court, which would handle nothing but railroad reorganizations; see Clay, The Case for a Special Railroad Reorganization Court, 7 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 450 (1940).
26 The ratio of debt to equity in railroad financial structures has generally exceeded the requirements of sound finance. Moore, Railroad Fixed Charges in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 47 J.
Pol. Econ. ioo (1939). Prior to reorganization the bonded debt of the Milwaukee was 67.7 per
cent, the Rock Island 70.92 per cent, and the Missouri Pacific 72.39 per cent of total capitalization. Spaeth and Windle, Valuation of Railroads under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
32111. L. Rev. 517 (1938).
20
Of the 136 Class I railroads (those having an operating revenue of over a million dollars)
twenty-two have sought reorganization under the statute. These twenty-two comprise almost
30 per cent of the nation's railroad mileage.
2sThe recent downward trend in railroad earnings and the demands for increased freight
rates are testimony to the wisdom of the ICC's position. In some cases, notably that of the
Erie, earnings are unable to support even a recapitalized financial structure. N.Y. Times, p. i,
col. 2 (April i6, i946), p. 23, col. 6 (April 27, 1946), p. 33, col. 4 (June 22, 1946).
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substantially reduced funded debt voluntarily, the public interest might require that a reduction be made through the reorganization process. The instant
case indicates the value of any new legislation which would preserve to some
degree the former interests in railroads by cutting down the duration of reorganization proceedings. 2 9This is probably the furthest extent to which preservation of old junior interests is justified, however, and thus if this result were attained additional legislation would become unnecessary.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion published too late for comment in the foregoing note, joins issue with the majority of the Court as to the
proper interpretation of the "cram down" provision of Section 77.30 Specifically
he disagrees with the majority view that a dissenting class cannot be "reasonably justified" in rejecting a plan if the plan as a whole is found to be fair and
equitable. This position, he asserts, renders the reasonable justification requirement mere "empty dialectic" and does violence to the intent of Congress. The
essence of the majority interpretation is that creditors are denied the protection
afforded by a vote predicated on their own interests and are compelled to accept
as a substitute safeguard the finding of the district court as to the general fairness of a plan.
Even if a dissenting class cannot upset a fair and equitable plan its vote
serves a useful purpose. The existence of a large dissenting class should be a
warning to the district court to scrutinize the portions of the plan thus called
into question with much more care than might otherwise be thought necessary.
Moreover, the possibility of provoking a large dissenting vote should lead the
ICC to use more caution in its formulation of the plan. As a corollary, a certain
amount of bargaining power is conferred upon the junior classes included in the
plan by the possibility that they may later dissent.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view, that in dissenting a class is "reasonably
justified" from a consideration of its interest alone, might place the ICC in a
confining position as to its formulation of a plan. After having determined the
total capitalization the ICC must provide fair and equitable compensation for
all senior creditors upon the "strict priority" theory. In a situation where this
distribution leaves only enough to partially compensate a junior group, the
threat that this junior group would reject the plan could completely stall the
reorganization. To prevent such an impasse the ICC might reasonably be
tempted to adjust the valuation in such a way as to eliminate completely marginal classes which otherwise would be admitted to partial participation. If this
29 Reorganizations have averaged eight to ten years in duration. Of the larger roads, the
Western Pacific reorganization was consummated in eight years and the Northwestern in ten;
the Missouri Pacific and the Rock Island, begun in 1933, and the Milwaukee, begun in 1935,
are still in the courts. More progress has been made with the smaller systems, but the quickest
reorganization, that of the Erie, lasted three years. The data are collected in Swaine, op. cit.
supra note 13.
3o RFC v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 66 S. Ct. 1384 (1946).
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course were taken, the total capitalization would always have to be equivalent
to the sum of the claims of the classes which were to be fully included. On the
other hand, if the ICC felt that such an adjustment of the valuation was not
feasible in a given case, it might be necessary for the ICC to provide for an issue
of a class of securities inferior to the common stock, such as warrants or optional
participation rights, in order to add to the compensation of a class which could
not otherwise be satisfied. This latter solution was favorably considered in
Congress and its use, in the discretion of the ICC, authorized by Section 77 as a
means of conserving as much as possible the former junior interests.3' But the
issuance of such "immediately valueless paper"3 may at least be questioned
both on the ground that it adds to the complexity of capital structures which
should be simplified, and on the ground that the issuance of these interests
tends to place on the market securities which do not meet a reasonable investment standard. Furthermore, the existence of warrants or participation rights
decreases the value of the common stock given to participants with more senior
claims to the extent that while the new common stockholders must bear the first
impact of future losses, they will not get the full benefit of future gains.
As mentioned in the discussion of the majority opinion, certain statements
made in Congress indicate that at least some legislators did not expect that a
large dissent by a class would be disregarded. In the act itself, however, Congress did not clearly specify the effect of a dissenting class vote, and it can be
forcibly argued that the provisions should be interpreted so as to facilitate reorganization rather than permit further obstructions and delays. As Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote prior to his appointment to the Court, with respect to the provisions of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, "The problem raised by these provisions relating to the dissenter is the problem of the 'fair' plan-i.e., how much,
if any, participation is to be given to each class."33
Corporations-Voting by Shareholders-Duty of Creditor Holding Voting
Control-[Federal.-To assist the Maryland Casualty Company when it faced
financial distress in the early 1930's, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
loaned to the Maryland system $7,500,000 in 1933 and an additional $io,ooo,ooo in 1934. The loans were made to wholly owned Maryland subsidiaries which

pledged with the RFC convertible preferred stock of Maryland that had been
purchased from the parent with the proceeds of the loan. In 1937, the two issues of preferred which secured the separate loans were reclassified into one
issue of i74,487 preferred shares. Each share carried ioo votes and was convertible by the holder to 50 shares of common stock, the only other outstanding
3'49 Stat. 913 (1935), ii U.S.C.A. § 209 (b)(3) (1946). See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,769 13,771
3
14,231 (1935).
32 Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 476 (1943).
33 SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and
Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part VIII, 142 (1940).

